Agricultural Bank and Construction Bank Deposit Fraud: Why People Believe Promises of Interest Rates Far Below Common Sense

The Incident

In July 2026, fraudsters impersonated the Agricultural Bank and Construction Bank on social media platforms like WeChat and Little Red Book, posting false advertisements offering "5.25% interest on 1 million yuan deposits." After victims added the scammers on WeChat, they were pitched overseas insurance and equity investment projects, ultimately losing money or personal information. Both banks officially denied these claims and reminded the market that benchmark interest rates were far below this level.

Why People Fall for It

The Non-Linearity of Trust

This isn't simply a case of fake accounts impersonating a bank. The scammers' cleverness lies in this: they didn't attempt to forge a perfect bank branch—instead, they exploited the illusion of transferable trust.

The human brain has a bug: when you trust "Institution A's" credibility and simultaneously see "messages claiming to be from A," you automatically project your trust in A onto that message. Even though:

1. The channel is wrong (WeChat vs. official website) 2. The product is wrong (5.25% vs. market rate of 2%) 3. The process is wrong (introduction after adding WeChat vs. direct access via official site)

Victims' psychology typically runs: "I trust the Agricultural Bank's reputation; high interest rates might be special products or exclusive internal customer benefits." This is the failure of trust cross-domain migration.

The Relativity of Common Sense

The premise itself of "interest rates far below common sense" contains a flaw. For:

• People with sufficient financial knowledge (professional investors): The gap between 5.25% and 2% triggers immediate alarm
• People lacking financial knowledge (retired small-town residents, migrant workers): "Bank promising 5%" sounds like "the bank adjusted its policies," with no sense of incongruity whatsoever

This isn't victims being "low IQ"—it's knowledge asymmetry being exploited with surgical precision by scammers.

Cognitive Bias Driven by Desire

Daniel Kahneman's "System 1 thinking" (fast, intuitive judgment) plays a role here:

• Framing effect: "Deposit 1 million, earn 4,000+ monthly" sounds better than "2% monthly interest at benchmark rates"
• Loss aversion: The fear of "if this were real, I'd lose 4,000/month" overwhelms the rational suspicion that "this message source is questionable"
• Social proof: Multiple similar ads on the platform create the illusion that "this looks like a real trend"

Deeper Logic: The Decoupling of Information Layer and Credibility Layer

Traditional fraud (fake bank branches, counterfeit passbooks) is "physical-layer forgery," easily exposed. The sophistication of modern trust fraud lies in this:

It completely abandons the effort to "forge authentic physical scenarios" and instead "reallocates credibility attribution."

• Genuine existing credibility (Agricultural Bank brand)
• Fraudulent information channel (WeChat account by unknown user)
• False product promise (5.25% fixed deposit)

Each element is individually true, but their combination is false. Scammers open a crack between the "information layer" (I say, you believe) and the "credibility layer" (Agricultural Bank backing), while victims' cognitive systems lack an effective "cross-verification mechanism" to bridge this gap.

The Dilemma for Institutions

The official response from the Agricultural Bank and Construction Bank is essentially "passive defense":

"Upon verification, no such deposit products exist; all related promotions are fraudulent"

But this response's effectiveness is limited because it can only reach: - People who already trust official channels - People with financial literacy - People actively searching for information in the incident's aftermath

For those who see advertisements on WeChat or Little Red Book and have limited financial knowledge, official refutations often arrive too late and fail to reach them.

Why These Frauds Repeatedly Occur

1. Credibility itself cannot be replicated: Banks' reputations are accumulated over years, but the cost of impersonating them approaches zero 2. Fluidity of victim populations: Every year, new retirees and returning migrant workers enter the financial market, becoming potential victims 3. Enforcement cost vs. fraud profit: One WeChat account gets banned, the scammer has already profited; one platform account gets shut down, a new one is already created 4. The long cycle of cognitive repair: It takes years for a defrauded person to rebuild their vigilance against "high-yield promises," but the next cohort of people has zero vigilance

Conclusion

This isn't a story of "scammers being too cunning"—it's a story of "the asymmetrical structure of trust."

Modern society's trust system is built on the tripod of institutional brand + official channels + standardized products. When these three are artificially separated, your cognitive system falls into momentary confusion. The scammer's job is to complete the transfer within this window of chaos.

The ultimate defense isn't "believing official refutals," but for everyone to develop the habit of "credibility attribution verification":

High-yield promise + non-official channel = automatically classify as fraud, no exceptions.